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I. INTRODUCTION
The Mayan Train is a major development project in the Yucatán
Peninsula. It is a tourist train that will traverse the jungles and coastline
of the region, going from the city of Palenque in the state of Chiapas
to the popular tourist location of Cancún in the state of Quintana Roo.1
The project promises to bring development to the region,2 but many
are criticizing the proposed plan for overlooking detrimental impacts
on the environment and local indigenous communities.3
This Comment will discuss the Mayan Train, pertinent international
agreements and the obligations they create for Mexico, and relevant
international caselaw interpreting these agreements. Specifically, this
Comment argues that the Mexican government failed to adequately
conduct meaningful consultations with indigenous communities
concerning the Mayan Train, and it failed to obtain the free, prior, and
informed consent of these communities to undergo this project.4 It also
argues that certain actions and omissions of the Mexican State in
respect to orders for emergency judicial relief have resulted in
violations of international human rights law protecting the right to
equal protection of the law and the right to judicial protection. 5
Furthermore, this Comment argues that because of its failure to obtain
the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous communities,
Mexico is in violation of its obligations under the American
1. Martha Pskowski, Mexico’s ‘Mayan Train’ is Bound for Controversy,
BLOOMBERG
CITYLAB
(Feb.
22,
2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-22/mexico-s-yucatan-trainbrings-promise-of-a-tourism-boom.
2. Id.
3. See Letter from Coordinación “Unir Fuerzas para la Defensa del Territorio”
et al., to Andrés Manauel López Obrador, President Elect of Mexico (Nov. 16, 2018)
(available
at:
https://issuu.com/pajaropolitico/docs/manifiesto_sobre_el_tren_maya) [hereinafter
Letter to AMLO] (arguing that the Mayan Train project will offer no benefits to
indigenous communities and requesting that the government obtain the free, prior,
informed consent of indigenous communities before beginning the project).
4. See Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 ¶ 134 (Nov. 28,
2007) [hereinafter Saramaka] (noting the duty on States to obtain the free, prior,
informed consent of indigenous peoples for large-scale development projects that
will affect their communities).
5. See discussion infra Section III.C and III.D.

848

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:4

Convention on Human Rights to protect human rights and to take steps
to prevent the abuse of these rights.6
Section II.A discusses the Mayan Train project in more detail.7
Section II.B gives a brief overview of the structure of the InterAmerican Human Rights system.8 Section II.C looks at Mexico’s
obligations under international law, namely under the American
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, “the Convention”) and the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (hereinafter,
“the Declaration”).9 Section III discusses the legal framework of
Section II and applies it to the Mayan Train project to explain how
Mexico’s actions violate international law.10 Section IV proposes
recommendations for the Mexican State, as well as for other actors,11
and finally, Section V offers a brief conclusion.12

II. BACKGROUND
A. THE MAYAN TRAIN
In 2018, the inauguration of Andrés Manuel López Obrador
(AMLO, as he is commonly known) as President set a new precedent,
as his leftist party, the National Regeneration Movement, has never
before held the office of the presidency.13 AMLO began his presidency
6. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights, art. 1, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, [hereinafter
ACHR] (“The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and
freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction
the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination
for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”); Case of
Yatama v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Costs, and Reparations,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, ¶ 189 (June 23, 2005) (noting that
there is a duty on Member States to suppress norms and practices that violate the
rights guaranteed by the ACHR).
7. Infra Section II.A.
8. Infra Section II.B.
9. Infra Section II.C.
10. Infra Section III.
11. Infra Section IV.
12. Infra Section V.
13. See Kurt Hackbarth, The Mexican Presidential Inauguration, JACOBIN,
(Dec. 1, 2018), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/12/mexico-amlo-presidentialinauguration-morena (describing the inauguration of AMLO and further noting that
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by denouncing neoliberalism,14 which seemingly contradicted one of
his largest campaign promises: the Mayan Train.15
Plans for the Mayan Train are long in the making.16 The initial
stages of the Mayan Train came into fruition in the first half of 2020
when AMLO and other members of his administration broke ground
on the project.17 Once completed, the so-called Mayan Train will
consist of multiple trains that will travel daily over 1,460 kilometers
of rail.18 Apart from the railway itself, the massive development
project, valued at $6.5 billion USD,19 contemplates the development
of urban centers and local tourism, among other objectives.20
In November 2018, the government held a national referendum
asking voters if they approved of the Mayan Train project.21 However,
only 850,527 Mexicans, representing less than one percent of the
nation’s electorate, voted in favor of the project.22 Notwithstanding the
low voter turnout and lack of public support for the train,23 the
government moved forward and in November and December 2019
consulted with indigenous communities, which is one of the legal
apart from the twelve years of Presidents Fox and Calderón, all other Presidents in
Mexico since the Mexican Revolution have been members of the Revolutionary
Institutional Party, or PRI).
14. Fernanda Hernández Orozco, AMLO Inicia su Gobierno con Una Crítica al
“Neoliberalismo”,
EXPANSIÓN
(Dec.
1,
2018),
https://expansion.mx/nacional/2018/12/01/amlo-inicia-su-gobierno-con-unacritica-al-neoliberalismo.
15. Pskowski, supra note 1.
16. See id. (explaining that AMLO has expressed his plans for the Mayan Train
beginning in 2006 when he first ran for president, and that even his predecessor,
Enrique Peña Nieto, made an unsuccessful attempt at a railroad development project
in the Yucatán peninsula).
17. Dulce Olvera, El estudio de impacto ambiental del Tren Maya llega muy
tarde y es engañoso, acusan indígenas, SINEMBARGO (June 21, 2020),
https://www.sinembargo.mx/21-06-2020/3806684.
18. CÁMARA DE DIPUTADOS-COMISIÓN ASUNTOS FRONTERA SUR, FICHA
TÉCNICA DEL TREN MAYA: ASPECTOS LEGISLATIVOS, ECONÓMICOS Y
SOCIO-CULTURALES 4 (2019) (Mex.) [hereinafter MAYAN TRAIN FACT SHEET].
19. Pskowski, supra note 1.
20. Olvera, supra note 17.
21. Victor Lichtinger & Homero Aridjis, Opinion, The Mayan Trainwreck,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
4,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/12/04/amlo/.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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requirements for a project of this magnitude.24 However, shortly after
these consultations concluded, the Mexican Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner on Human Rights (“U.N.H.C.H.R.”) issued a press
release critiquing the government for not complying with international
standards regarding indigenous consultations.25 Civil society
organizations have echoed this sentiment.26 To date, no further formal
consultations have been undertaken with the affected indigenous
communities, although the government did establish follow up
mechanisms and additionally held more informational meetings that
took place in March 2020.27
24. See CONVOCATORIA al Proceso de Consulta Indígena y Jornada de
Ejercicio Participativo Ciudadano sobre el Proyecto de Desarrollo Tren Maya,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 15-11-2019 (Mex.) (available at:
https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5579050&fecha=15/11/2019)
(informing the public of the consultation process in different locations throughout
the country and noting relevant legal instruments requiring indigenous consultations,
including, inter alia, ILO Convention 169, the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and various domestic laws).
25. See U.N. Press Release, The Mexican Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner on Human Rights, El proceso de consulta indígena sobre el Tren
Maya no ha cumplido con todos los estándares internacionales de derechos humanos
en la materia (Dec. 19, 2019) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release] (noting the failure of
the State to discuss the possible negative impacts of the project, the failure of the
State to answer questions regarding negative impacts, the perceived obligation on
behalf of the indigenous community to assent to the project in order to receive much
needed governmental assistance, the failure of the State to use culturally appropriate
means, the underrepresentation of non-authoritative members of indigenous
communities, and the underrepresentation of indigenous women during the
consultations).
26. See, e.g., Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, Pronunciamiento de la
4
Asamblea
Nacional
del
CNI-CIG
(Dec.
2019),
http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/2019/12/20/pronunciamiento-de-la-4-asambleanacional-del-cni-cig/ [hereinafter Zapatista 4th National Assembly] (claiming the
consultations were a façade); Postura del Centro de Derecho Ambiental respecto al
Proyecto Tren Maya, CENTRO MEXICANO DE DERECHO AMBIENTAL (June 8, 2020),
https://www.cemda.org.mx/postura-del-centro-mexicano-de-derecho-ambientalrespecto-al-proyecto-tren-maya/ (claiming consultations were not undertaken with
the goal of obtaining consent); Adriana Varillas, Rechazan organizaciones
indígenas consulta sobre Tren Maya, EL UNIVERSAL (July 12, 2019),
https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/rechazan-organizaciones-indigenasconsulta-sobre-tren-maya (claiming that the consultations didn’t meet the
requirements to be considered a true indigenous consultation).
27. See GOBIERNO DE MEX., SEGUNDO INFORME DE GOBIERNO 2019-2020 423
(2020) (noting the follow up mechanisms and March 2020 meetings). But see

2021]

GOING OFF THE RAILS ON THE MAYAN TRAIN

851

Continuing with the required legal processes, an environmental
impact assessment (EIA) was published in June 2020 by the National
Fund for Touristic Development (FONATUR), which oversees the
project, although information on the entity that actually conducted the
assessment was not made available to the public.28 The EIA was
immediately criticized because it neglected to contemplate long term
impacts caused by the project.29 Furthermore, some scholars criticized
the EIA for its failure to adequately assess all potential risks that the
project poses.30 Despite these concerns, the State continued
construction on the project.31
Obvious concerns over the project have led some members of civil
society to take legal action. In the late spring of 2020, a federal judge
for the District Court of Chiapas issued an amparo against all new
construction on the project.32 The amparo does not apply to works
Ernesto Méndez, Semarnat obliga a aprobar impacto ambiental del Tren Maya,
EXCELSIOR (July 31, 2020), https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/semarnatobligada-a-aprobar-impacto-ambiental-del-tren-maya/1397176 (quoting Víctor
Manuel Toledo, Secretary of the Secretariat of the Environment and Natural
Resources, in a July 2020 press conference where he said that a separate process of
indigenous consultations was necessary to be in compliance with international law).
28. FONATUR, MANIFESTACIÓN DEL IMPACTO AMBIENTAL cap. 1 pp. 33
(2020).
29. See Ricardo Hernández Ruiz, Tren Maya: Manifestación de Impacto
Ambiental no contempla polos de desarrollo, PIE DE PÁGINA (June 19, 2020),
https://piedepagina.mx/tren-maya-manifestacion-de-impacto-ambiental-nocontempla-polos-de-desarrollo/ (explaining that the EIA does not assess the longterm impacts of the project on urban centers surrounding the newly planned stations
and arguing that these development poles will have a major environmental impact
in the long run). But see Ernesto Méndez, supra note 27 (quoting Victor Manuel
Toledo who argues that it is theoretically impossible to fully assess the regional risks
of the project given its sheer size).
30. See infra Section III.A.2.
31. Jesús Vázquez, Inicia construcción del Tren Maya en sus cuatro primeros
tramos,
EL
ECONOMISTA
(May
28,
2020),
https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/empresas/Inicia-construccion-del-Tren-Mayaen-sus-cuatro-primeros-tramos-20200528-0113.html (“Construction of the Mayan
Train has now begun in its first four stretches. The work consists of the improvement
of existing tracks and the modernization of existing stations in the Palenque-Izamal
stretch, as well as the extension of the Izamal-Cancún route. . . .”).
32. Amparo frena obras nuevas en Tramo 1 de Tren Maya por epidemia de
Covid-19, FORBES (June 23, 2020), https://www.forbes.com.mx/noticias-amparoobras-nuevas-tramo-1-tren-maya/. See generally Bruce Zagaris, The Amparo
Process in Mexico, 6 U.S.–MEX. L.J. 61, 62 (1998) (defining the amparo as a unique
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focused on the maintenance of current rails, however, and is only
applicable in three municipalities in Chiapas (Chiapas is only one of
the five states where the project is being undertaken).33 Furthermore,
the amparo was primarily issued in light of public health concerns
over the COVID-19 pandemic and, according to FONATUR, is
limited in time to the duration of the public health emergency. 34
FONATUR has further doubted the significance of the amparo and
indicated that it may not be legally bound to comply with it.35
Additionally, more amparos have been issued against the project and
the government has maintained its position that these amparos do not
constrict its plans.36
Although there seems to be much uncertainty around the Mayan
Train project, high-ranking governmental actors intend to move
forward with it.37 This is evidenced, inter alia, by the awarding of
contracts38 and continued objections against legal actions intended to
action in the Mexican legal system which allows an individual to seek injunctive
relief against any act that threatens, inter alia, life or personal liberty); Ley de
Amparo, Reglamentaria de los Artículos 103 y 107 de la Constitución Política de los
Estados Unidos Mexicanos [LARACPEUM], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF]
02-04-2013, últimas reformas DOF 15-06-2018 (legislative statute that governs the
amparo action).
33. Amparo frena obras nuevas en Tramo 1 de Tren Maya por epidemia de
Covid-19, supra note 32.
34. Id.
35. See Press Release, Fondo Nacional de Fomento al Turismo (June 23, 2020)
(on
file
with
Mexican
government)
(available
at:
https://www.gob.mx/fonatur/prensa/fonatur-avanza-con-obras-del-tren-maya-alamparo-de-la-ley) [hereinafter FONATUR Press Release] (stating that “The Mayan
Train has been classified by the Superior District Court (which ordered the
injunction) as a public work that ‘in itself is of public order and social interest’, and
therefore will proceed according to its corresponding analysis and, if necessary, in
challenge of the injunction”).
36. See SEGUNDO INFORME DE GOBIERNO 2019-2020, supra note 27, at 423–24
(explaining that of the six total amparos against the Mayan Train project, none have
a final judgment and some are only provisional suspensions that do not impede the
project).
37. See id. (explaining intentions to move forward with the project despite the
amparos).
38. See Fonatur anuncia empresa ganadora de licitación del Tramo 1 del Tren
Maya (Palenque Escárcega), GOV’T MEXICO (Apr. 23, 2020),
https://www.gob.mx/fonatur/prensa/fonatur-anuncia-empresa-ganadora-delicitacion-del-tramo-1-del-tren-maya-palenque-escarcega-240854
(awarding
contracts for the first leg of the project).
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stop the project.39

B. PRINCIPAL ORGANS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS
SYSTEM
The Inter-American Human Rights system is comprised of two
principal organs: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“the Commission”) and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights
(“the Court”).40 The Commission was established in 195941 and has the
primary purpose of “the effective promotion and defense of human
rights.”42 Among other functions, the Commission has the authority to
hear complaints brought by individuals and by third parties against
States Parties for violations of the Convention43 or the Declaration.44
Additionally, the Commission has authority to request a State Party to
take precautionary measures when there are “serious and urgent
situations presenting a risk of irreparable harm to persons or to the
subject matter of a pending petition or case before the organs of the
Inter-American system.”45
39. See FONATUR Press Release, supra note 35 (stating that the government
will proceed with the project in challenge of an amparo); SEGUNDO INFORME DE
GOBIERNO 2019-2020, supra note 27, at 423–24 (claiming that current amparos do
not constrain the project).
40. See ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 33 (establishing the Commission and the
Court as competent organs to ensure the rights guaranteed in the Convention).
41. Inter–American
Commission
on
Human
Rights,
OAS,
http://www.oas.org/en/about/commission_human_rights.asp (last visited Nov. 13,
2020).
42. Fernando Volio, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 30 AM.
U.L.R. 65, 68 (1980).
43. ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 44.
44. See Christina Cerna, Reflections on the Normative Status of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1211, 1212–13
(2009) (noting the Commission’s position that the Declaration has legally binding
force and further noting the presence of this position in the Commission’s decisions).
45. Inter–Am. Comm’n H.R., Rules of Procedure of the Inter–American
Commission on Human Rights, art. 25 (effective Aug. 1, 2013). See generally id. at
art. 25(2)(a)–(c) (defining a serious situation as “a grave impact that an action or
omission can have on a protected right or on the eventual effect of a pending decision
in a case or petition before the organs of the inter-American [sic] system[,]” defining
an urgent situation as a “risk or threat that is imminent and can materialize, thus
requiring immediate preventive or protective action[,]” and defining irreparable
harm as “injury to rights which, due to their nature, would not be susceptible to
reparation or adequate compensation.”).
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The Court, while having the authority to interpret the Convention
and determine if there has been a violation of a right protected by the
Convention,46 can only accept a contentious case presented to it by the
Commission or by the concerned State Party.47 The Court also has the
jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions when a State Party requests the
advice of the Court on a particular issue involving the interpretation
of a human rights treaty into its domestic laws.48 Before the Court can
exercise jurisdiction over a country in a contentious case, that country
must first have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court upon its
ratification of the Convention or through a special agreement.49 As a
note, Mexico has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.50
After the Court determines that there is a violation of an individual’s
rights under the Convention, it has the authority to order a State Party
to ensure the enjoyment of that individual’s rights as well as to order
that reparations be paid to the claimant.51 Under Article 63(2) of the
Convention, the Court may adopt provisional measures it deems
necessary in order to avoid irreparable harm to persons.52 The facts of
the situation must show “gravity, urgency, and [a] likelihood of
irreparable damage to persons to justify the extraordinary remedy of
46. ACHR, supra note 6, at arts. 62(3) & 63(1).
47. Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 76 AM. J.
INT’L L. 231, 238 (1982); ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 51(1).
48. ACHR, supra note 6, at arts. 64(1)–(2).
49. See id. at art. 62(3) (“The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases
concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention
that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or have
recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration pursuant to the
preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement.”).
50. See Multilateral Treaties: American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of
San
Jose,
Costa
Rica”
(B-32),
ORG.
OF
AME.
STATES,
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_b32_american_convention_on_human_rights_sign.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2020)
[hereinafter Multilateral Treaties] (accepting the jurisdiction of the Court as binding
ipso facto on Mexico with regard to the interpretation and application of the
Convention).
51. ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 63(1) (“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that
the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated.
It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation
that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair
compensation be paid to the injured party.”).
52. ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 63(2).
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provisional measures.”53
As a State Party to the Convention, and having accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court, Mexico is bound to the decisions of the
Court.54 Furthermore, Mexico’s Supreme Court affirmed that it does
not have the competence to review a decision by the Inter-American
Court and that is has the obligation to comply with any judgment
against the Mexican State.55 Additionally, the Mexican Supreme Court
believes that the interpretative criteria of the Inter-American Court in
contentious cases in which the Mexican State is not a party serve as
guidance for all Mexican judges and should be followed to the extent
they provide greater protection for human rights than that provided for
in Article 156 of the Mexican Constitution.57

C. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM’S RELEVANT LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS REGARDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
i.

The Right to Property under Article 21 of the ACHR

The jurisprudence of the Inter-American system has greatly
expanded conceptions of indigenous property rights over the past two
decades.58 This is due in part to the Court’s use of other treaties and
53. Jo M. Pasqualucci, Provisional Measures in the Inter-American Human
Rights System: An Innovative Development in International Law, 26 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 803, 833 (1993) (citing ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 63(2)).
54. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 50.
55. SERGIO GARCÍA RAMÍREZ, COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS
HUMANOS, VOTOS PARTICULARES EN LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS Y REFLEXIONES SOBRE CONTROL DE CONVENCIONALIDAD 59 (Comisión
Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, 2d ed. 2015).
56. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 1,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 08-052020 (Mex.) (“In the United Mexican States all persons shall enjoy the human rights
recognized by this Constitution and by international treaties to which the Mexican
State is a party, as well as the guarantees for their protection, whose exercise shall
not be restricted or suspended, save for in certain cases and under certain conditions
that this Constitution establishes.”).
57. RAMÍREZ, supra note 55, at 59.
58. See generally Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral
Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American
Human Rights System, INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R. (2010) [hereinafter Report on
Ancestral Land Rights] (explaining the developments in the Inter-American Human
Rights System with regard to the right to indigenous property).
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developments in international law to interpret the provisions of the
Convention.59
The first landmark indigenous property rights case to reach the
Court was Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua.60 This case arose out of a dispute
between the Awas Tingi community and the Nicaraguan government
when the latter granted permission to private timber companies to log
the lands that traditionally belonged to the Awas Tingni community.61
In this case, the Court analyzed, inter alia, Nicaragua’s compliance
with Article 21 of the Convention.62 The Court recognized the deep
spiritual connection that indigenous communities have with the land,
and the importance of maintaining their cultural legacies in future
generations.63 Importantly, the Court also noted the differences in
indigenous land tenures and held that indigenous customary practices
of land ownership, evidenced by possession rather than formal title to
the land, are sufficient in establishing ownership.64 The recognition of
59. See Maya Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, InterAm. Comm’n H.R. Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶ 87 (2004)
(explaining how the Inter-American Human Right System looks to developments in
international law to interpret the ACHR, giving particular importance to ILO C.169
with regard to interpreting the rights of indigenous peoples); see also United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [UNRIP], G.A. Res. 61/295, (Oct.
2, 2007) (multilateral agreement that came into effect in 2007 and is used by the
Court to interpret States obligations under the Convention).
60. The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug.
31, 2001) [hereinafter Awas Tingni]. See generally S. James Anaya & Claudio
Grossman, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A Step in the International Law
of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (offering an
overview of this seminal case and its importance with regard to the Court’s
indigenous rights jurisprudence).
61. Anaya & Grossman, supra note 60, at 3–4.
62. Awas Tigni, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 ¶ 142; see ACHR, supra note
6, at art. 21 (“1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The
law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. 2. No one
shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for
reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms
established by law. 3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall
be prohibited by law.”).
63. Awas Tigni, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 ¶ 149.
64. Id. ¶ 151; see also id. ¶ 140 (argument made by the Commission stating that
there is a customary norm that “affirms the rights of indigenous peoples to their
traditional lands”).
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communal property rights would become a seminal holding of the
Court.65 Notably, when issuing reparations, the Court ordered
Nicaragua to provide the same rights under its national legislation that
were recognized under the Convention, particularly with regard to
titling land to indigenous communities pursuant to the customs of
these communities.66
After laying the groundwork for indigenous land rights in Awas
Twingni, the Inter-American system has since fleshed out the
definition of the right to property in the indigenous context. In Mary
& Carrie Dann v. United States, the Commission examined the
concept of consent in the context of the relinquishment of communal
land rights.67 In Dann, the Commission interpreted the obligations of
the United States under the Declaration, which the Commission
considers binding upon Member States of the Organization of
American States,68 but which the United States does not recognize as
binding on itself.69 The claimants alleged that their land use rights had
not been extinguished, while the government argued those rights had
been extinguished due to encroachment by non-indigenous peoples
and by an administrative award for the land in question.70 Here, the
Commission determined that the concept of fully informed mutual
consent hinges upon full disclosure of information and obtaining
mutual consent of the entire indigenous community.71 Furthermore,
65. Accord Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case
12.053, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev.
1 ¶ 114 (2004) (“[I]ndigenous peoples enjoy a particular relationship with the lands
and resources traditionally occupied and used by them, by which those lands and
resources are considered to be owned and enjoyed by the indigenous community as
a whole and according to which the use and enjoyment of the land and its resources
are integral components of the physical and cultural survival of the indigenous
communities and the effective realization of their human rights more broadly.”).
66. Awas Tigni, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 ¶ 138.
67. See Dann v. United States of America, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.
Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L./V./II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 ¶¶ 114–117 (2002)
[hereinafter Dann] (describing dispute between the parties which arose in part when
one band of the Western Shoshone Nation consented to litigate a land claim with the
federal government but the Danns and others, who also belonged to the Western
Shoshone Nation, did not consent).
68. Cerna, supra note 44, at 2.
69. Dann, Case 11.140, Inter–Am. Comm’n H.R. Report No. 75/02 ¶ 94.
70. Id. ¶¶ 43, 114–23.
71. Id. ¶ 140.
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this case reiterated important holdings from the Awas Tingni case;
notably that, among other rights, indigenous property rights must be
interpreted “with due regard to the particular principles of human
rights law governing the individual and collective interests of
indigenous peoples.”72
As noted in the Dann case, consent of the indigenous community is
a key principle of this body of law, especially with regard to
development projects and natural resource exploitation that affect the
land interests of indigenous peoples.73 The Court further expounded
on this concept of consent in Saramaka v. Suriname.74 That case arose
from a dispute over land concessions from the government of
Suriname to private industries for the use of natural resources which
both the government and the Saramaka people claimed ownership
over.75 The Court held that Suriname had the duty to ensure the
participation of indigenous communities in culturally appropriate
ways in projects76, such as natural resource exploitation, that affect
their communities.77 The Court further held that indigenous
communities were entitled to benefit sharing from such projects and
that independent entities must conduct environmental and social
impact assessments prior to these projects.78 In analyzing this case, the
Court noted seven criteria79 that must be met in the consultation
process, a process which is required under international legal
72. Id. ¶ 131.
73. See International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention, 1989 (No. 169) art. 6, June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 [hereinafter
C.169] (laying out various obligations including the requirement that governments
must obtain the consent of indigenous communities with regard to “legislative or
administrative measures which may affect them directly.”); Case of the Saramaka
People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 ¶ 134 (Nov. 28, 2007) (explaining that there is a duty
to obtain the consent of indigenous communities for projects that have a “major
impact” on their communities).
74. See generally Saramaka, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 134.
75. Id. ¶ 118.
76. See generally id. at 38, n.127 (noting that the Court defines “projects” to
include “any proposed activity that may affect the integrity of the lands and natural
resources” of the indigenous community).
77. Id. ¶ 129.
78. Id.
79. See id. ¶ 133.
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frameworks.80 These criteria impose on the State a duty to: actively
consult with communities “according to their customs and traditions”;
accept and disseminate information among indigenous communities;
communicate constantly with indigenous communities; act in good
faith during the consultation process, using culturally appropriate
means, and with the end goal of reaching an agreement; consult with
indigenous communities at early stages of the project and in
accordance with the traditions of the community; fully inform the
indigenous community of all potential risks, to the environment,
health, and otherwise; and allow indigenous communities to use
traditional decision-making practices during the consultation
process.81
Perhaps the most important holding in Saramaka is that large-scale
development projects require the state not only to consult with
indigenous communities, but to obtain the free, prior, and informed
consent of these communities.82 The Court further noted how other
international bodies have declared this obligation to obtain consent for
large-scale development projects to be indispensable to protecting
indigenous rights.83 The Court has also looked to the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in
determining a State’s obligations to its indigenous communities.84 The
UNDRIP provision regarding the obligation to obtain the free, prior,
and informed consent of indigenous communities affected by a
development project is virtually synonymous with the Court’s
interpretation of this obligation in Saramaka.85 The requirements the
80. See Report on Ancestral Land Rights, supra note 58, at 103 n.646 (referring
to the obligation of consultation expressed in ILO C.169 and UNDRIP).
81. Saramaka, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 133.
82. Id. ¶ 134.
83. See id. ¶¶ 135–36 (citing the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people [“consent is essential
for the protection of human rights of indigenous peoples in relation to major
development projects”] and the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of all forms of
Racial Discrimination [noting that in some cases, consultation alone falls short of
protecting indigenous rights to land]).
84. See Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits
and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, at 62 n.288 (June
27, 2012) [hereinafter Sarayaku] (applying UNDRIP’s provisions to that case and
holding that the right to cultural identity is a fundamental right).
85. Compare UNDRIP, supra note 59, art. 32(2) (“States shall consult and
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Court has imposed on States to comply with the right to effective
consultation are also sine qua non requirements for the obligation to
obtain the free, prior, informed consent of indigenous communities.86
Furthermore, free, prior, informed consent requires that consultations
“be designed to secure the free and informed consent” of indigenous
peoples, provide for the participation of indigenous communities
during all stages of the project, and that indigenous communities
receive compensation for environmental harm as well as a share of the
benefits of such projects “in a manner consistent with their own
development priorities.”87
ii.

The Right to Equal Protection of the Law and to Judicial
Protection under Articles 24 & 25 of the ACHR and the
Obligation to Ensure the Enjoyment of Rights under Article 1
of the ACHR

Under the Inter–American system’s jurisprudence, States have the
affirmative duty to adopt special measures to guarantee the full and
equal rights of indigenous peoples to their traditionally held lands and
to give special consideration to “the weakness or helplessness of

cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own
representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to
the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources,
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of
mineral, water or other resources.”), with Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
172, ¶ 134 (requiring the State of Suriname to obtain the “free, prior, informed
consent” of the Saramaka people “according to their customs and traditions” with
regard to “large-scale development or investment projects that would have a major
impact in Saramaka territory”).
86. See HRC, Free, Prior and Informed Consent: A Human Rights-Based
Approach, ¶ 20–22, A/HRC/39/62 (Aug. 10, 2018) [hereinafter Free, Prior and
Informed Consent: A Human Rights-Based Approach] (stating that the constituent
elements of free, prior, informed consent include the absence of “intimidation,
coercion, manipulation, and harassment”; freedom on the part of the indigenous
communities to follow their traditions and customs in the institutions representing
them in consultations; that they have influence in decision-making throughout the
consultation process; that they be consulted as early as possible; that they be allowed
to use their own decision-making processes; and that there be quantitatively and
qualitatively sufficient information provided to them).
87. INTER–AM. COMM’N ON H.R., ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND SOCIAL INCLUSION:
THE ROAD TOWARDS STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY IN BOLIVIA, ¶ 248 (2007).
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certain social groups or sectors.”88 This is further expressed in the duty
to suppress norms and practices that violate the rights established in
the Convention, including the right to property.89 Furthermore, the
Court has interpreted principles of law under Article 24, namely the
principles of non-discrimination and equality, to be norms of jus
cogens.90
Mexican courts have applied these standards to some extent in prior
cases when interpreting the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention
(No. 169) of the International Labour Organization (hereinafter
“C.169”).91 In one of these cases, the Mexican Electoral Court of the
Judiciary of the Federation struck down a state legislative order when
local election officials did not take into account the traditions and
customs of the members of the local indigenous community in election
proceedings.92 That court found that the obligations of C.169 were
consistent with the Federal Law on the Prevention and Elimination of
Discrimination which requires the Mexican State to promote equality
and freedom of persons in “real and effective” ways. 93 The Mexican
court specifically noted that this requires the State to “take into
account the customs” of indigenous groups in any legal matter or
procedure and to “guarantee throughout any legal process” the right to
linguistic assistance.94 This demonstrates that there is precedent in
88. Saramaka, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 91; Yatama, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, ¶ 201; see also ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 1 (requiring States
Parties to respect and ensure the enjoyment of the rights in the Convention).
89. Yatama, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, ¶ 189.
90. See id. ¶ 184 (noting the prevalence of the princples of non-discrimination
and equality in numerous legal instruments and further noting its importance in
domestic and international legal frameworks).
91. See generally C.169, supra note 73.
92. Press Release, Dirección General de Jurisprudencia, Seguimiento y
Consulta, Joel Cruz Chávez y otros vs. Quincuagésima Novena Legislatura del
Estado de Oaxaca y otras, TRIBUNAL ELECTORAL DEL PODER JUDICIAL DE LA
FEDERACIÓN
[TEPJF],
https://www.te.gob.mx/IUSEapp/tesisjur.aspx?idtesis=13/2008&tpoBusqueda=S&
sWord=joel,cruz,chavez) (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (Mex.) [hereinafter Cruz v.
59th Legislature of Oaxaca].
93. Id.; Ley Federal para Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminación [LFPED] art. 2,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-06-2003, últimas reformas 21-06-2018
(Mex.) (“It is the State’s duty to promote conditions of freedom and equality of
persons so that these rights are real and effective.”).
94. Cruz v. 59th Legislature of Oaxaca, supra note 92.

862

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[36:4

Mexico that applies the duty to provide appropriate legal measures to
the indigenous community in order to respect the right to equal
protection of the law.95
In addition to establishing special measures to guarantee equal
protection of the law, Article 25 of the Convention requires Member
States to provide access to judicial remedies when there is a violation
of fundamental rights.96 Because this obligation is a positive right, it
requires states to ensure this right by taking all necessary actions to
ensure effective protection of this right.97 This means that judicial
remedies must not only exist, but they must also be effective. 98
Furthermore, States must take affirmative steps to ensure that judicial
protection effectively establishes whether or not there has been a
violation of rights and that redress is not only effective, but also that
the infringed right is restored so as to be fully enjoyed. 99 The
jurisprudence of the Inter-American system provides that these
protections must be provided whenever there is a threat to the
95. See id. (“[T]he Mexican State, through its organs, must provide the necessary
measures of correction or compensation at their disposal to those subjects situated
in inequality in fact and allow access to the free and effective exercise of their
fundamental rights, being that in any other manner these rights become mere
rhetorical declarations lacking any virtuality in the sense that their function as
instruments for the full development of the person is altered and the dignity of the
person is undermined with the support of the state’s framework.”).
96. ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 25; see also id. at art. 1 (requiring States Parties
to ensure the enjoyment of the rights of the Convention).
97. See Laurens Lavrysen, Positive Obligations in the Jurisprudence of the
Inter–American Court of Human Rights, 7 INTER–AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 94, 96
(2014) (noting that the obligation to ensure rights “requires states to undertake all
actions which are necessary to enable individuals under their jurisdiction to exercise
and enjoy their human rights.”).
98. See, e.g., Awas Tingni, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 114 (Aug. 31,
2001); see also Report on Ancestral Land Rights, supra note 58, ¶ 353 (citing various
cases supporting assertion).
99. See Report on Ancestral Land Rights, supra note 58, ¶ 354; Maya Indigenous
Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.
Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶ 184 (2004); see also
Velázquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4 ¶ 166 (July 29, 1988) (“As a consequence of [the duty to ensure the free and
full exercise of rights], the States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation
of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to
restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages
resulting from the violation.”).
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territorial rights of indigenous peoples.100
Furthermore, the Court and the Commission have reiterated that
Member States have a duty to respect and ensure rights.101 As seen in
Awas Tingni, the Court requires states to create provisions within their
domestic legal framework that are in line with the protections of the
Convention.102 However, even with a sufficient legal framework in
place that is consistent with the Convention, implementation of such a
framework always poses an issue.103 In recognizing this, the Court has
held that States have the duty to guarantee the “free and full exercise
of human rights,” meaning that “[i]ndigenous and tribal peoples have
a right to see the law implemented and applied in practice, specifically
in relation to their territorial rights.”104

III.

ANALYSIS

This section will explain how omissions made by the Mexican State
during the indigenous consultations as well as its noncompliance with
judicial orders result in violations of various indigenous rights under
the Convention. It will first look at the duty to consult and analyze
each of the Saramaka factors to determine if these procedures were
followed for the Mayan Train project.105 Then it will discuss whether
the Mexican State obtained the free, prior, and informed consent of
indigenous communities with respect to the Mayan Train project. It
100. Report on Ancestral Land Rights, supra note 58, ¶ 357; Case of Yakye Axa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 ¶ 74(c) (June 15, 2005).
101. See Report on Ancestral Land Rights, supra note 58, ¶ 42 (explaining that
the charter of the Organization of American States places this burden upon member
states and furthermore that this is reflected in Articles 1.1 and 2 of the Convention).
102. Awas Tingni, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 138.
103. Report on Ancestral Land Rights, supra note 58, ¶ 44 (“A favorable legal
framework is ‘insufficient for due protection of [indigenous peoples’] rights if it
does not go hand in hand with policies and actions by the State to ensure application
of effective compliance with the provisions which the sovereign State has
undertaken to apply.’”).
104. Id.; see also Yakye Axa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 ¶ 141 (June 15,
2005) (“legislation alone is not enough to guarantee the full effectiveness of the
rights protected by the Convention, but rather, such guarantee implies certain
governmental conducts to ensure the actual existence of an efficient guarantee of the
free and full exercise of human rights.”).
105. See Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 133.
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will then analyze the rights to equal protection of the law and the right
to judicial protection and assess if the Mexican State is infringing these
rights.106

A. MEXICO FAILED TO COMPLY WITH PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH
THE MAYAN TRAIN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
In Saramaka, the Court held, inter alia, that a State has the duty of
ensuring the effective participation of indigenous communities with
regard to development projects in their territory.107 The foremost issue
regarding the Mayan Train project is the lack of an adequate process
of indigenous consultation and participation in the decision-making
process. The next subsection will analyze Mexico’s compliance with
the standards the Inter–American System requires for effective
participation.108
i. Duty to Actively Consult According to Traditions and Customs of
Indigenous Peoples
The first duty States Parties have is to actively consult with
indigenous communities according to their traditions and customs.109
With regard to the requirement to consult according to the traditions
and customs of indigenous peoples, the Court has emphasized the need
for interpretation or equivalent means to ensure that indigenous
peoples understand legal proceedings.110 The Court has further noted
that there is no clear model for how to undertake consultations, but
that they should take into account the “different forms of indigenous
organization” that “respond to the internal processes of these
people.”111 Consultations should also include an appropriate temporal
dimension, which accounts for indigenous forms of decision106. See ACHR, supra note 6, at arts. 24–25 (describing the rights to equal
protection and judicial protection, respectively).
107. Saramaka, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 129.
108. See id. ¶ 133 (listing factors that are necessary for the effective participation
of indigenous peoples in consultations regarding development projects).
109. Id.
110. Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 201 (June 27, 2012).
111. Id. ¶ 202.
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making.112
In this case, there was an underrepresentation of certain segments
of the indigenous population during the consultations.113 The Mexican
Office of the U.N.H.C.H.R. further asserted that the consultations did
not respect the customs and traditions of indigenous communities,
noting in particular that the sessions were short, translations were
scarce and often inadequate, and that access to the meeting sites was
difficult for many.114 This evidence shows that the Mexican State,
while making efforts to actively consult with concerned indigenous
peoples, has not fully consulted with indigenous communities with
due regard for their traditions and customs.115
ii. Duty to Disseminate Information
Second, the State has the duty to accept and disseminate
information among indigenous communities.116 The Court has held
that this translates into a duty upon states to receive and provide
information to indigenous communities.117 The Court has further
interpreted this standard by looking at the domestic law of States,
noting that indigenous communities must have “full knowledge” of
the potential harm to their “social, cultural, economic, and political
cohesion.”118
112. Id.
113. See U.N. Press Release, supra note 25 (stating that most of the members that
participated in the indigenous consultations were municipal and ejidal leaders, that
many other members of these communities did not participate, and that indigenous
women were greatly underrepresented).
114. Id.; see also Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Concluding Observation on the Combined Eighteenth to Twenty-First Periodic
Reports of Mexico, ¶ 20, CERD/C/MEX/CO/18-21 (Sept. 19, 2019) (noting that this
is a recurring problem as the Mexican State has failed to take into account indigenous
views and has failed to comply with all of the requirements of ILO C.169 in other
indigenous consultation proceedings.).
115. Cf. Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 ¶¶ 144–46, 154 (finding
that the Saramaka people put great importance in preserving the environment for its
future generations, that the Saramaka have traditionally used the timber products as
a means of sustenance, and that the government of Suriname did not account for
these customs and traditions in granting land concessions, resulting in a failure on
the part of the State to comply with this requirement).
116. Id. ¶ 133.
117. Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 208.
118. See id. at 59–60, n.276 (interpreting this standard by citing judgments of the
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Here, Mexico failed to hear from and accept information from some
members of civil society regarding ecological risks.119 Furthermore,
the State failed to disseminate the environmental impact statement
before the consultation began, as FONATUR only submitted it to the
government on June 16, 2020.120 This is problematic, as it means that
all of the relevant information, especially the potential risks to the
environment and the community, was not made known to members of
indigenous communities during the consultations.121 Furthermore, the
environmental impact assessment was criticized by scholars for
omitting important considerations.122 Additionally, there are
allegations that the government attempted to hide a report compiled
by experts that addressed some of the negative consequences of the
project.123
Colombian Constitutional Court).
119. See Laura Castellanos, Opinion, La Guerra de los Pueblos Indígenas contra
el Tren Maya ya Comenzó en México, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/es/post-opinion/2019/12/16/la-guerra-de-lospueblos-indigenas-contra-el-tren-maya-ya-comenzo-en-mexico/ (explaining that
information was not heard from groups of scientists, including GeoComunes and the
Mexican Civil Council of Forestry).
120. See Tren Maya presenta ante Semarnat, Estudios Ambientales para los
Tramos
1,
2
y
3,
FONATUR
(June
16,
2020),
https://www.gob.mx/fonatur/prensa/tren-maya-presenta-estudios-ambientales-paralos-tramos-1-2-y-3-ante-semarnat.
121. See U.N. Press Release, supra note 25 (explaining that in the informational
meetings government officials only spoke of the benefits and that when questioned,
they did not give clear responses as to what risks the project may entail).
122. See ANA ESTHER CECEÑA ET AL., OBSERVATORIO LATINOAMERICANO DE
GEOPOLÍTICA, OBSERVACIONES A LA MANIFESTACIÓN DE IMPACTO AMBIENTALTREN MAYA 22–23 (2020) (arguing, inter alia, that the environmental impact
assessment overlooks the necessity of an appropriate number of adequate crossings
for fauna, that it does not properly account for the habitat needs of small-sized
species, that it does not fully contemplate the logistics of the number of daily trains
(there would be an initial need for 60 trains daily, but by 2053, there would be a need
for 491 trains daily according to the estimated number of passengers the EIA
proposes), that it does not fully account for the amount of noise and light pollution,
and that it does not fully contemplate the amount of fauna that would be killed by
the train due to the lack of proper fencing around the tracks); see also Postura del
Centro de Derecho Ambiental Respecto al Proyecto Tren Maya, supra note 26
(noting that among some of the greatest risks to the environment are the
fragmentation of the earth, depletion and contamination of the water table, extinction
of flora and fauna, increased generation of solid waste, and noise pollution).
123. See Carlos Carabaña, Conacyt Ocultó Informe Crítico con el Tren Maya, EL
UNIVERSAL (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/conacyt-

2021]

GOING OFF THE RAILS ON THE MAYAN TRAIN

867

Because the government failed to accept information from at least
some members of civil society and because it did not inform members
of indigenous communities of all of the risks of the project (including
those outlined in the environmental impact assessment), it is not in
compliance with this standard.124
iii. Duty to Communicate Constantly
Third, there is a duty to communicate constantly with indigenous
communities.125 The Commission has described this as being a
“process of dialogue and negotiation.”126 The U.N. Special Rapporteur
on Indigenous Rights has further explained this as requiring
communication during “all phases of planning and implementation of
the measure or activity in question.”127
As discussed in Section II, the primary communication between the
government and the indigenous communities occurred in the
indigenous consultations in November and December of 2019. 128
Separate from these consultations, the government has also created
fifteen follow-up and verification commissions to oversee compliance
with agreements made during the consultative phase.129 Furthermore,
the government held regional meetings with indigenous community
members on March 7, 2020 in order to allow a forum for discussion of

oculto-informe-critico-con-el-tren-maya-ven-riesgo (noting that an investigation
into the effects of the Mayan Train project, which was initially planned to be released
during the consultative phase, was later decided not to be released during that phase
so that it would “not influence” the consultations); see also BARBA MACÍAS
EVERARDO ET AL., TERRITORIOS MAYAS EN EL PASO DEL TREN: SITUACIÓN ACTUAL
Y RIESGOS PREVISIBLES (Conacyt ed. 2019) (detailing various negative impacts of
the Mayan Train).
124. Cf. Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 154 (finding Suriname
to be in violation of Article 21 of the Convention when it failed to carry out
environmental and social impact assessments which would have apprised the
Saramaka of potential risks to their territories).
125. Id. ¶ 133.
126. Report on Ancestral Land Rights, supra note 58, ¶ 285.
127. Victoria Taulo-Corpuz (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples), Mandato de la Relatora Especial Sobre los Eerechos de los Pueblos
Indígenas, at 6, OL MEX 2/2019 (Mar. 5, 2019).
128. Segundo Informe de Gobierno, supra note 27, at 423.
129. Id.
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the Mayan Train project.130 These events have occurred before the
awarding of contracts and before construction began on the project.131
All of these factors tend to show an effort to maintain constant
communication.132
iv. Duty to Act in Good Faith
The fourth duty is for the state to act in good faith during the
consultation process, using culturally appropriate means with the end
goal of reaching an agreement.133 The standard of good faith in
undertaking consultations requires that consultations be “a true
instrument for participation,” that there be a “climate of mutual trust,”
and that there is an absence of any form of coercion.134
The government’s efforts to maintain regular communications with
indigenous communities is a factor that tends to show good faith in
encouraging participation from the indigenous community.135
Furthermore, the fact that the government undertook the process of
indigenous consultation early on during the development project
similarly shows good faith.136 However, the Mexican Office of the
130. Diálogo Permanente con Pueblos Indígenas sobre Tren Maya; Se Realiza
Seguimiento de Acuerdos con Gobierno Federal, INPI (Mar. 7, 2020),
https://www.gob.mx/inpi/es/articulos/dialogo-permanente-con-pueblos-indigenassobre-tren-maya-se-realiza-seguimiento-de-acuerdos-con-gobierno-federal236996?idiom=es.
131. See Fonatur Anuncia Empresa Ganadora de Licitación del Tramo 1 del Tren
Maya (Palenque Escárcega), supra note 38 (awarding contract for the first leg of
the Project); Vázquez, supra note 31 (indicating that construction began in May
2020).
132. Cf. Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines, Inc., [2017]
1 S.C.R. 1099, para. 57 (Can.) (finding Crown consultation procedures to be
adequate when there was a requirement for the private oil company to continue
consulting with indigenous groups throughout the project, file ongoing engagement
reports with the government, and to continue engaging with indigenous communities
during operation of new oil pipeline project); see also Report on Ancestral Land
Rights, supra note 58, ¶ 285 (“Consultation is not as [sic] a single act, but a process
of dialogue and negotiation that implies both parties’ good faith and the objective of
achieving a mutual agreement.”).
133. Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 133.
134. Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 186.
135. See id. (requiring states to use consultations as a true instrument of
participation).
136. See U.N. Press Release, supra note 25 (commending government for its early
action).
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U.N.H.C.H.R. noted that during the informational meetings in the
consultative phase, although coercive practices were not used outright,
indigenous participants felt obligated to approve the project in order
to receive the government’s attention for the basic needs of the
community.137 Other activists have criticized the consultation process,
claiming that it only served to “legitimize” the project.138
Although the early attempts to consult with indigenous peoples and
the government’s attempts to maintain open streams of
communication are factors that show good faith, there are serious
concerns that the consultations were tainted with coercion. 139
Furthermore, the Mexican State has not undertaken the proper
indigenous consultations in regard to other development projects,
which raises suspicion about whether the current procedures were
undertaken in good faith.140 However, the existence of coercive
practices is sufficient to show that there was a lack of good faith. 141
Additionally, because the government said more consultations are
required142 yet continued to move forward with the project in absence
137. See id. (“During the informative sessions in the consultation stage, some
authorities claimed that the guarantee of various economic, social, and cultural rights
was not conditioned upon acceptance of the project. Nevertheless, the Mexican
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner of Human Rights observed that as a
consequence of the manner in which the project was presented and the sessions
progressed, indigenous persons expressed their approval of the project as a method
of receiving attention for basic needs like water, health, education, work, housing,
healthy environment, and culture, reasoning that affects the free character of the
consultations.”). But see Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 186
(“Thus, it is an inherent part of every consultation with indigenous communities that
‘a climate of mutual trust be established,’ and good faith requires the absence of any
form of coercion by the State or by agents or third parties acting with its authority
or acquiescence.”).
138. Olvera, supra note 17.
139. See U.N. Press Release, supra note 25.
140. See Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic
Report of Mexico, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/MEX/CO/6 (2019) (noting with
concern a high number of reports of licenses granted for exploitation and
development without proper indigenous consultations being undertaken first).
141. See Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 186 (requiring “the
absence of any form of coercion by the State” for a showing of good faith).
142. See Méndez, supra note 27 (referring to a statement made by the Secretary
of the Mexican Secretariat of the Environment and Natural Resources that a separate
process of indigenous consultations was necessary to comply with international
law).
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of these new consultations, there is further evidence of a lack of good
faith.143
v. Duty to Consult at Early Stages
The fifth requirement is to consult with indigenous communities at
early stages of the project, and in accordance with the traditions of the
community.144 The Court has looked to ILO C.169 to interpret this
standard as meaning the consultation must take place before the
implementation of the project that will affect indigenous
communities.145
Here, the Mexican government consulted with indigenous groups
early on during the process.146 Consultations with the indigenous
community began a little over a year after the public referendum. 147
They also occurred before major contracts148 were awarded and before
construction began.149 However, as previously noted, the government
did not adequately consider the traditions and customs of the
community.150
Moreover, the government moved forward with contract bidding
and awarding as well as construction, despite the concerns noted by
the Mexican Office of the U.N.H.C.H.R. and others.151 The purpose of
143. See Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, at 52, n.241 (explaining
this criteria by citing to the Peruvian Constitutional Court’s reasoning that
“transferring . . . consultation to a moment after the publication of the measure
eliminates the expectation of the intervention underlying the consultation [which]
would also mean that the consultation takes place on acts that have been executed,
which could be construed as a lack of good faith”).
144. Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 133.
145. Id. ¶ 181.
146. U.N. Press Release, supra note 25.
147. See Lichtinger & Aridjis, supra note 21 (noting that the national referendum
occurred in November 2018); CONVOCATORIA al Proceso de Consulta Indígena
y Jornada de Ejercicio Participativo Ciudadano sobre el Proyecto de Desarrollo Tren
Maya, supra note 24 (giving notice that the indigenous consultations would take
place in November and December 2019).
148. See Fonatur Anuncia Empresa Ganadora de Licitación del Tramo 1 del Tren
Maya (Palenque Escárcega), supra note 38 (awarding contracts for the first leg of
the project).
149. See Vázquez, supra note 31 (noting the commencement of construction in
May 2020).
150. See U.N. Press Release, supra note 25.
151. See id.; Letter to AMLO, supra note 3.
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communicating early is so that indigenous communities have
sufficient time for internal consideration of a project and are able to
deliver feedback to the State; it is not merely an item to tick off on the
government’s procedural to-do list.152 Unfortunately, the government
moved forward on the project without properly addressing concerns
from the indigenous community, which seems to defeat the purpose of
this requirement.153
vi. Duty to Disclose All Potential Risks
The sixth duty is to fully inform the indigenous community of all
potential risks, to the environment, health, and otherwise.154 The Court
has further described this duty as requiring an environmental and
social impact assessment to be performed by a competent and
independent entity.155 The purpose of these assessments is to
“preserve, protect, and guarantee” indigenous peoples’ relationship
with their land and to “guarantee[] their subsistence as peoples.” 156
Furthermore, these assessments should be completed before approval
of development project plans.157
As previously discussed, there is a major issue in regard to this
factor.158 The environmental impact assessment for the project was not
released until months following the indigenous consultation
process.159 Furthermore, the environmental impact assessment fails to
152. See Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 133.
153. See id.
154. Id. (“The State must also ensure that members of the Saramaka people are
aware of possible risks, including environmental and health risks, in order that the
proposed development or investment plan is accepted knowingly and voluntarily.”).
155. See id. ¶ 129 (requiring, inter alia, that Suriname undertake an environmental
and social impact assessment before issuing concessions within Saramaka territory).
156. Report on Ancestral Land Rights, supra note 58, ¶ 234; Saramaka, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 138.
157. See Report on Ancestral Land Rights, supra note 58, ¶ 246 (“States must
guarantee that the sustainability of investment or development plans or projects and
natural resource exploration and exploitation projects in indigenous and tribal
peoples’ territories is ‘measured in advance, using effective mechanisms of
participation for the persons and groups affected, regardless of whether the State has
recognized their ownership.’”).
158. See supra note 123.
159. See Olvera, supra note 17; cf. Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v.
Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
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account for serious risks to the environment and long-term impacts160
including the possible pollution of underground water supplies.161
The fact that the environmental impact assessment was not
available during the 2019 indigenous consultations means that the
government did not fully apprise the indigenous communities of all of
the risks of the project.162 This concern was echoed by the Mexican
Office of the U.N.H.C.H.R., which stated that only the benefits of the
project were disclosed during the consultative phase.163 Lastly,
through the scholarship of environmental experts, it is evident that the
environmental impact assessment has obvious flaws.164
vii. Duty to Allow Traditional Decision-Making Processes
The seventh requirement is for the State Party to allow indigenous
communities to use traditional decision-making practices during the
consultation process.165 As previously stated, consultations should
take account of indigenous processes and indigenous forms of
organization.166
The U.N. noted that during the consultations, the procedure of how
to conduct the informative sessions was decided unilaterally by the
No. 309, ¶¶ 214, 226 (Nov. 25, 2015) (finding Suriname failed to comply with this
standard when it made concessions to mining companies before an environmental
impact assessment was conducted).
160. See Ricardo Hernández Ruiz, Tren Maya: Manifestación de Impacto
Ambiental no Contempla polos de Desarrollo, PIE DE PÁGINA (June 19, 2020),
https://piedepagina.mx/tren-maya-manifestacion-de-impacto-ambiental-nocontempla-polos-de-desarrollo/ (explaining that the EIA does not assess the longterm impacts of the project on urban centers surrounding the newly planned stations
and arguing that these development poles will have a major environmental impact
in the long run).
161. Postura del Centro de Derecho Ambiental Respecto al Proyecto Tren Maya,
supra note 26.
162. Cf. Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 148 (finding that the
level of consultation undertaken by the government of Suriname with the Saramaka
was insufficient to ensure their effective participation, that there were no
environmental impact assessments completed and disseminated before land
concessions, and that environmental harm did in fact occur as a result of the
concessions).
163. U.N. Press Release, supra note 25.
164. See CECEÑA ET AL., supra note 122, at 22–23.
165. Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 133.
166. See Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 202.
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government.167 As a consequence, there were concerns over sufficient
participation of members of indigenous communities representative of
the group as a whole, as well as over the length of the sessions and the
adequacy of translations.168 The fact that indigenous traditions were
not considered in determining the procedures of the informational
sessions shows that the consultations did not completely account for
traditional decision making procedures of the concerned indigenous
communities.169
viii.

Summary of Saramaka Procedural Safeguards for Effective
Participation of Indigenous Peoples in Consultations with the
Mexican Government

An analysis of the Saramaka procedural safeguards shows that there
are serious areas of concern regarding the Mexican State’s duty to
consult with indigenous communities.170 Most notably, the
consultations lacked full disclosure of all of the risks to indigenous
communities,171 failed to fully disclose this information during the
consultative phase,172 and lacked the appearance of good faith on the
part of the government.173 Therefore, the Mexican government failed
to effectively allow indigenous communities to participate in
consultations regarding the development of their territories.174

B. THE MEXICAN STATE DID NOT OBTAIN THE FREE, PRIOR,
167. U.N. Press Release, supra note 25.
168. Id.
169. See Sarayaku, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 202 (noting that
although there is no formal model for the appropriate procedures in indigenous
consultations, such consultations must “take into account the national circumstances
and those of the indigenous peoples, as well as, contextually, the nature of the
measures under consultation.”).
170. See supra Section III.A.1–7.
171. See discussion supra Section III.A.6.
172. See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
173. See discussion supra Section III.A.4.
174. See Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 133 (establishing
requirements for indigenous consultations); see also C.169, supra note 73, at art.
6(1)(a) (requiring states party to the agreement, of which Mexico is one, to “consult
the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through
their representative institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative
or administrative measures which may affect them directly[.]”).
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INFORMED CONSENT OF INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES IN SOUTHERN
MEXICO BEFORE IT UNDERTOOK THE MAYAN TRAIN PROJECT
The lack of compliance with the procedural safeguards for
indigenous consultations shows that the free, prior, and informed
consent (FPIC) was not obtained in the case of the Maya Train.175 As
explained above, the underrepresentation of certain segments of the
indigenous community demonstrates that participation of the entire
affected indigenous community has not been accounted for in all
stages of the proceedings.176 The facts further indicate that coercive
practices were present during the consultations177 and these
consultations were perceived by some as more of an informative
process of what the government’s plans were.178 An opportunity to
influence the outcome of decisions is inherently included in the
obligation to obtain FPIC, and the fact that the indigenous
communities were unable to change the outcome shows that they did
not give their FPIC to the project.179
Additionally, the FPIC of the entire community has not been
obtained in this case. As expressed by the Commission in the Dann
case, consent must be obtained from the entire affected indigenous
community before a decision is made that affects the land rights of the
community.180 In that case, the United States government prevented
175. See Free, Prior and Informed Consent: A Human Rights-Based Approach,
supra note 86, ¶¶ 20–22 (defining free, prior, and informed consent to include
essentially all of the Saramaka factors for procedural safeguards in indigenous
consultations); see also Section 3.A (explaining how some of these safeguards were
not complied with in the present situation).
176. See U.N. Press Release, supra note 25 (noting the underrepresentation of
indigenous women and further noting that most of the participants in the meetings
were community leaders).
177. Id.
178. See Castellanos, supra note 119 (describing the consultation as a way of
legitimizing the project and noting a statement made by AMLO prior to consultation
that the project “va porque va,” meaning it would happen for the sake of happening).
179. See Free, Prior and Informed Consent: A Human Rights-Based Approach,
supra note 86, ¶ 15 (explaining the “right of indigenous peoples to influence the
outcome of decision-making processes affecting them, [which is] not a mere right to
be involved in such processes. . . .”).
180. See Dann, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser L./V./II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 ¶ 140 (2002) [hereinafter Report No. 75/02]
(defining fully informed consent to require “that all of the members of the
community are fully and accurately informed of the nature and consequences of the
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the Dann sisters and others from intervening in a claim brought by
some members of the same tribal nation that would relinquish the
nation’s land rights.181 The Commission concluded that the FPIC of
the indigenous community was not obtained for those proceedings
because only one band of the tribal nation litigated claims with the
government, and did so with no express permission from the rest of
the nation.182 In the present situation, there are many members of the
indigenous community who have voiced their objections to the Mayan
Train project.183 Furthermore, although there were 93,142 indigenous
persons that voted in favor of the project,184 this number is greatly
outweighed by the population of the indigenous community of the
affected region which, by some estimates, totals roughly 2.29 million
indigenous persons.185 Furthermore, the government reports that
during the consultative meetings, only 5,436 persons attended,
representing 985 indigenous communities out of a total of 1,440
indigenous communities that were asked to participate in the
proceedings.186 This means that roughly one-third of the indigenous
communities that will be affected by the project did not have
representation at the consultative meetings.187 Even if these statistics
were indicative that a majority of the indigenous communities gave
their FPIC to the project, these numbers show that Mexico does not
comply with the standard in Dann that “all of the members of the
community are . . . provided with an effective opportunity to

process and provided with an effective opportunity to participate individually or as
collectives.”).
181. See id. ¶¶ 114–17.
182. See id. ¶¶ 140–41.
183. See, e.g., Letter to AMLO, supra note 3; Zapatista 4th National Assembly,
supra note 26; Castellanos, supra note 119.
184. SEGUNDO INFORME DE GOBIERNO 2019-2020, supra note 27, at 84.
185. Localidades indígenas, INPI, http://www.cdi.gob.mx/localidades2010gobmx/ (follow “LOCALIDADES INDIGENAS 2010 – FORMATO XLSX” link)
(last visited Oct. 23, 2020) (detailing the total and indigenous populations of all of
the states and federal entities of Mexico, including the states of Campeche, Chiapas,
Quintana Roo, Tabasco, and Yucatán where the Mayan Train project is underway).
186. Convocatoria y Protocolo para el Proceso de Consulta Indígena sobre el
Proyecto de Desarrollo Tren Maya, GOBIERNO DE MÉXICO (Nov. 15, 2019)
https://www.gob.mx/inpi/documentos/convocatoria-al-proceso-de-consultaindigena-sobre-el-proyecto-de-desarrollo-tren-maya.
187. See id.
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participate individually or as collectives.”188 One may argue that the
concept of obtaining consent through consultations should not place
such an excessive burden on States.189 Nevertheless, the underlying
purpose of these consultations is to “allow the full expression of the
viewpoints of the peoples concerned,” and as such, States must
actively seek out the representative opinions of all affected indigenous
community members.190
Because of the failure to follow the required procedural safeguards
and the failure to obtain the free, prior, and informed consent of
indigenous communities before proceeding with the project, Mexico
is in violation of Article 21 of the Convention as the Inter–American
system has interpreted it.191

C. MEXICO IS IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO EQUAL
PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE 24 OF THE ACHR
The actions by some of Mexico’s executive branch officials of
ignoring orders of the judiciary and failing to meaningfully consult
with indigenous peoples is discriminatory against indigenous peoples
and contrary to Article 24 of the Convention. As explained above, the
Mexican Electoral Court of the Judiciary of the Federation has
previously interpreted the State’s obligations under C.169 in two prior
cases.192
188. Report No. 75/02, supra note 180, ¶ 140.
189. S. J. Rombouts, The Evolution of Indigenous Peoples’ Consultation Rights
Under the ILO and U.N. Regimes, 53 STAN. J. INT’L L. 169, 194 (noting States’
concerns that a strict consent requirement in ILO C.169 would give indigenous
communities a “veto power” and explaining that the solution was to compromise
and require only that States consult with indigenous communities “with the objective
of achieving agreement or consent. . . .”).
190. Id. at 195.
191. See ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 21; cf. Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 172, ¶ 154 (finding, inter alia, that the failure to carry out social and
environmental impact assessments, failure to put in place adequate safeguards to
prevent environmental harm, and the failure to allow the Saramaka to participate
effectively in the decision-making process resulted in a violation of Article 21 of the
ACHR).
192. See INT’L LABOR ORG., APPLICATION OF CONVENTION NO. 169 BY
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA 161-68 (2009)
(explaining two cases heard by the Mexican Electoral Court of the Judiciary of the
Federation brought by indigenous claimants); see also Cruz v. 59th Legislature of
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In the present case there have been procedural elements that have
not taken account of indigenous customs, traditions, or linguistics
during the consultative period.193 Notably, the two necessary elements
noted in Cruz v. 59th Legislature of Oaxaca were not complied with:194
(1) the right to have adequate linguistic services available,195 and (2)
the obligation on the State to take into account the traditions and
customs of the indigenous communities.196 The right to consultation
guaranteed under C.169197 and under caselaw of the Inter-American
Human Rights system198 was not complied with as consultations
lacked certain elements of good faith and disclosure required by these
laws.199 These actions by the Mexican government further contradict
its own judicial precedent.200
The failure to comply with its own judicial precedent, domestic law,
and with the jurisprudence of the Court indicates that the Mexican
State is violating indigenous peoples’ right to equal protection under
Article 24 of the Convention.201

D. MEXICO IS IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL
PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE 25 OF THE ACHR AND THE
OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THE ENJOYMENT OF RIGHTS UNDER

Oaxaca, supra note 92 (noting that the principles of C.169 are part of the “supreme
law of the union,” and that special measures are necessary to ensure the full judicial
protection of indigenous people).
193. See U.N. Press Release, supra note 25.
194. See Cruz v. 59th Legislature of Oaxaca, supra note 92.
195. See U.N. Press Release, supra note 25 (noting the inadequacy of translations
during informational meetings during the consultative phase).
196. See id. (noting the methodology of the informational meetings was not
planned in accordance with indigenous culture and norms).
197. C.169 supra note 75, at art. 6(1)(a).
198. See discussion supra Section II.C.
199. See discussion supra Section III.A.
200. See Cruz v. 59th Legislature of Oaxaca, supra note 92 (requiring special
measures to be taken with respect to the traditions and customs of indigenous
persons by virtue of C.169).
201. See Yatama, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, ¶ 186 (holding that Article
24 “entails obligations for the State to respect and ensure the principle of equality
and non-discrimination in the safeguard of other rights and in all domestic laws that
it adopts.”).
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ARTICLE 1 OF THE ACHR
Under Article 25, the right to judicial protection requires remedies
to be available that are effective and that are, in practicality,
enforceable.202 The Court held in Sarayaku that the remedy of amparo
is effective in protecting fundamental rights.203 Yet, the executive
branch of the Mexican government is challenging the legal effect of
amparos issued by Mexican courts against the Mayan Train project. 204
There is precedent in Mexican courts requiring compliance with the
obligation to adopt special measures to secure the rights of indigenous
communities.205 However, the State has moved ahead with
construction, and has not taken full substantive measures to address
the insufficiencies of the indigenous consultation proceedings or to
obtain the FPIC of affected communities to undergo the project. 206
Furthermore, the ignoring of provisional measures intended to protect
indigenous communities is in blatant disregard for the protection of
their fundamental rights, including the right to judicial protection.207
Although the government has responded that the amparos issued in
lower courts of the country were temporary and not conclusively
resolved,208 the Court places an obligation on States Parties to comply
with provisional measures issued by national judiciary authorities for
the period in which a risk of harm to human rights remains.209
In the present case, the indigenous community’s right to property is
still at risk due to the lack of adequate consultations and the failure to
obtain consent for the project.210 Because potential harm to these
202. Report on Ancestral Land Rights, supra note 58, ¶ 354; Maya Indigenous
Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.
Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 ¶ 184 (2004).
203. Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 272.
204. See FONATUR Press Release, supra note 37 (stating that the project would
move forward in opposition to the court’s injunction).
205. See Cruz v. 59th Legislature of Oaxaca, supra note 92.
206. See discussion supra Sections III.A & III.B.
207. Cf. Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 ¶¶ 275–78 (explaining
how the government’s failure to comply with the issuance of an amparo violated the
right to judicial protection under Article 25 of the Convention because the
government was under the obligation to protect and respect the rights of the
Sarayaku people, even when the precautionary measure was temporary).
208. SEGUNDO INFORME DE GOBIERNO 2019-2020, supra note 27, at 423–24.
209. Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 276.
210. See discussion supra Sections III.A & III.B.
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communities’ rights remains, the Mexican State is violating their right
to judicial protection by failing to comply with amparos issued by the
judiciary branch.211 Mexico’s Amparo Law was designed to apply to
international human rights treaties212 and when an amparo is issued it
requires punctual compliance and specifies that noncompliance by
government officials includes penalties up to removal from office and
prosecution.213 The fact that the government proceeded with the
project in disregard of indigenous rights, conduct which is currently
under investigation by national authorities,214 demonstrates a
deprivation of due process for the indigenous individuals who are
purportedly protected by these amparos.
The failure of the Mexican state to protect the rights of the
indigenous communities in the ways just discussed furthermore
constitutes a violation of the duties of abstention and the duty to
guarantee rights, as interpreted by the Court and the Commission.215
In Mexico’s case, it has adopted laws that are designed to protect the
human rights of indigenous peoples.216 However, as previously noted,
211. See SEGUNDO INFORME DE GOBIERNO 2019-2020, supra note 29, at 423–24
(claiming that the provisional suspension of the project by several of the amparos
does not impede the project’s progress); see also FONATUR Press Release, supra
note 35 (explaining that FONATUR did not feel it was bound by an injunction issued
by a federal court in Chiapas in the Spring of 2020 and that the project would
continue in challenge of the amparo if necessary).
212. Ley de Amparo, Reglamentaria de los Artículos 103 y 107 de la Constitución
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [LARACPEUM], art. 1 frac. I, Diario
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 02-04-2013, últimas reformas DOF 15-06-2018.
213. Id. at art. 192.
214. See Investigará CNDH Posibles Violaciones a Derechos Humanos en
Amparo contra Tren Maya, COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.cndh.org.mx/sites/default/files/documentos/202008/COM_2020_254.pdf (announcing investigation into posible violations of rights
associated with the granting of an amparo to indigenous communities in Calakmul,
Campeche against the Mayan Train).
215. See ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 1 (requiring States Parties to respect and
ensure the enjoyment of rights); Lavrysen, supra note 97, at 96 (noting that the
obligation to ensure rights “requires states to undertake all actions which are
necessary to enable individuals under their jurisdiction to exercise and enjoy their
human rights.”).
216. See, e.g., Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 2,
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 08-052020 (Mex.) (recognizing the unique identity of indigenous peoples in Mexico and
establishing, inter alia, that indigenous communities shall have the autonomy to
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such legislation is not sufficient per se in protecting indigenous rights
due to the fact that legislation does not, ipso facto, beget
enforcement.217 The Mexican government has the duty to “take such
measures as may be necessary to actually comply with the provisions
of the Convention.”218 With regard to the amparos, these measures
would include actually complying with these orders and refraining
from progressing construction on the project.219
In conclusion, because the executive branch of Mexico has failed to
comply with judicial orders issued by its own courts and refused to
take effective measures to ensure rights are protected under both
domestic and international laws, the government is in violation of the
right to judicial protection.220

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are conclusions as to the course of action the
Mexican government and other actors should take to avoid
infringements of indigenous rights and violations of international law
as well as to safeguard indigenous rights.

A. APPROPRIATE MEASURES THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT
“decide internal forms of living as well as social, economic, political, and cultural
organization” as well as autonomy to “conserve and improve their habitat”); Ley del
Instituto Nacional de los Pueblos Indígenas [LINPI] art. 4, frac. III, Diario Oficial
de la Federación [DOF] 04-12-2018 (Mex.) (containing various provisions that
establish the National Institute of Indigenous Peoples which has the goal of, inter
alia, “promoting, fortifying, and assisting the exercise of self-determination and
autonomy of indigenous and Afro Mexican communities . . . “); Ley Federal para
Prevenir y Eliminar la Discriminación [LFPED] arts. 1, 15 Quáter, Diario Oficial de
la Federación [DOF] 11-06-2003, últimas reformas 21-06-2018 (Mex.) (stating the
objective of the statute as “preventing and eliminating all forms of discrimination
against any person in terms established by Article 1 of the [Mexican Constitution]”
and providing special safeguards for indigenous peoples in order to prevent
discrimination against them).
217. See Yakye Axa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 141.
218. Report on Ancestral Land Rights, supra note 58, at 14, n.95.
219. Cf. Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 277 (finding that the
State of Ecuador had was obligated to comply with amparos issued by its national
courts).
220. Cf. id. ¶¶ 272–78 (finding the Ecuadorian State in violation of, inter alia,
Article 25 of the Convention for its failure to guarantee effective legal remedies and
for violating amparos issued by national courts).
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SHOULD TAKE TO COMPLY WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS
First, Mexican courts should issue preliminary injunctions to halt
all construction on the project until further measures are taken to
ensure that indigenous land rights are protected. Furthermore, the
executive branch of government must legitimize these injunctions and
comply with them, unlike the amparos it has all but denounced.221 This
is imperative as the continuation of construction only serves to
continue violations of indigenous land rights.222 Injunctions should be
in place until such time that the government has properly consulted
with the indigenous community.223
Second, the government must organize new consultation
procedures with the indigenous community. Special consideration
must be given to these procedures, as the government has previously
undervalued their significance.224 Notably, the government must
ensure that it gives special emphasis to the aspects of the proceedings
that were found to be insufficient in the previous consultations.225 The
government should focus on involving the entire affected indigenous
community in these proceedings.226 Special emphasis must be given to
include all members and not only indigenous leaders, and further
221. See FONATUR Press Release, supra note 35 (explaining that FONATUR
did not feel it was bound by an injunction issued by a federal court in Chiapas in the
Spring of 2020).
222. Cf. Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, at 52, n.241 (citing to
various national authorities asserting the importance of undertaking consultations
before the development or legislative measure in question is undertaken so that
indigenous rights are afforded proper safeguards).
223. See Ley de Amparo, Reglamentaria de los Artículos 103 y 107 de la
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [LARACPEUM] art. 77(ii),
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 02-04-2013, últimas reformas DOF 15-062018 (stating that “the effects of the concession of the amparo shall be, when the act
complained of . . . implies an omission, to oblige the responsible authority to respect
the right implicated and comply with the demands of that right.”).
224. See discussion supra Section III.A (explaining how the government has
continued work on the Mayan Train despite low turnout during the consultative
phase and outcries by various actors condemning the procedures).
225. See discussion supra Section III.A.
226. Cf. Report No. 75/02, supra note 180, ¶ 140 (holding that for determination
of property interests maintained by indigenous communities, a process of “fully
informed and mutual consent on part of the indigenous community as a whole[]” is
required).
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emphasis should be given on including indigenous women in the
proceedings. The government should also ensure that these
consultations are conducted in a way that respects the traditional
methods of decision making of the indigenous communities and also
that they are conducted through culturally appropriate means. 227 This
includes, but is not limited to, making the information of the
proceedings (as well as the proceedings themselves) available in a
language that is understood by indigenous community members. 228
Furthermore, the government must approach these new consultations
with a good faith intention of actually obtaining the consent of
indigenous communities and, where applicable, should empower these
communities to contribute their plans for their own development into
the Mayan Train project.
Third, the government should remember that the consultation
process does not mean that a singular meeting is all that is required.229
The government should ensure that it constantly communicates with
the indigenous community, apprising indigenous peoples of all
developments in the project and especially those that may have an
impact on their communities.230
Lastly, the government should authorize a competent independent
party to undertake a new environmental impact assessment. As
previously explained, the current environmental impact assessment
overlooked key areas that may affect indigenous communities,
including the long–term effects of the project on the ecosystem and its
potential negative effects on the ecosystem, including to flora and
fauna.231 This independent body should also be made known to the
public in order to assure both its competency and impartiality. 232 As
227. See Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 133.
228. See Cruz v. 59th Legislature of Oaxaca, supra note 92 (ordering the
government to “guarantee throughout any legal process, the right [for indigenous
persons] to be assisted, if requested, by interpreters and defenders with knowledge
of their language.”).
229. See Report on Ancestral Land Rights, supra note 58, ¶ 285 (“Consultation is
not as [sic] a single act, but a process of dialogue and negotiation that implies both
parties’ good faith and the objective of achieving a mutual agreement.”).
230. See id.
231. CECEÑA ET AL., supra note 122, at 22–23.
232. See, e.g., Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 194(e) (ordering
Suriname to ensure that an environmental impact assessment is conducted “by
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this information is critical to the consultation process, this new
assessment should be undertaken before consultation meetings are
conducted anew, and its results should be widely disseminated among
the indigenous communities (in culturally appropriate methods) and
among the general public as well.233
i. The Social and Legal Importance that Civil Society has
Regarding the Mayan Train Project
Members of civil society should continue to apply pressure on the
government to comply with its domestic and international legal
obligations by advocating for the interests of indigenous communities
over the interests of commercial development. Furthermore, the
private sector companies that are undertaking construction should also
insist that the government take measures to stall construction contracts
temporarily to ensure that indigenous rights are protected. This is
important to note as companies have an influential role to play in
respecting human rights.234
Additionally, since the ability to bring a case before the
Commission is vested in private citizens, civil society has an important
legal role in safeguarding indigenous rights.235 If normal civil efforts
independent and technically competent entities” prior to granting land concessions
to private businesses).
233. Cf. Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 207 (finding the
environmental impact assessment undertaken in that case did not comply with the
Court’s criteria because the Sarayaku did not participate in its preparation, it was
undertaken by an entity contracted by a private oil company without the State’s
oversight, and did not account for the “social, spiritual and cultural impact that the
planned development activities might have on the Sarayaku People.”).
234. See Ivonne Cruz et al., Baker Inst. Pub. Policy, Social Conflicts and
Infrastructure Projects in Mexico: Baker Institute Report No. 06.21.19 7, BAKER
INST. (2019) (noting, in the context of the Mayan Train and other development
projects in Mexico, the need for social license, or social permission, as well as
regulatory permission in order for companies to undertake large–scale projects); see
also Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 309, ¶ 225 (Nov. 25, 2015)
(“[B]usinesses must respect the human rights of members of specific groups or
populations, including indigenous and tribal peoples, and pay special attention when
such rights are violated.”).
235. See ACHR, supra note 6, at art. 44 (“Any person or group of persons, or any
nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of the
Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or
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of soliciting the government do not prompt any change in the
government’s course, members of civil society should petition the
Commission for its intervention.
ii. Role of the Commission and the Court in Granting Precautionary
Measures and Developing Indigenous Rights Law
The Commission has the role of monitoring the current situation in
Mexico and, if the Mexican government does not change its course in
any of the ways described above, it would be appropriate for the
Commission to ask Mexico to take precautionary measures in the form
of ceasing construction until the matter is settled by the
Commission.236 Additionally, the Commission might consider
requesting that the Court take provisional measures against the
Mexican government.
As discussed above, the situation must be both serious and urgent
with a risk of irreparable harm in order for the Commission to request
that a state take precautionary measures.237 In the current situation,
such a massive development project will alter the socio-economic
landscape of the region to such a degree that it will not be possible to
undo the effects of the project once it is completed, thereby making
the harm irreparable.238 Furthermore, there is an urgency to halt the
work of this project since the ongoing construction is contributing to
effects on the indigenous community that will prove to be
irreversible.239 Reasonable provisional measures might include
ordering the cessation of construction, new consultations with the
complaints of violation of a human right set forth in this Convention.”).
236. Cf. Report No. 75/02, supra note 180, ¶¶ 14–25 (requesting that the
government of the United States stall trespass and impoundment actions as well as
administrative fines against the Danns and others for the presence of their cattle on
federal lands due to the irreparable harm that the livestock impoundment and the
fines would cause to the Danns).
237. Rules of Procedure of the Inter–American Commission on Human Rights, at
art. 25, INTER–AM. COMM’N H.R. (Aug. 1, 2013).
238. See MACÍAS EVERARDO ET AL., supra note 123 (noting the potential damage,
inter alia, to: natural water supplies; the ability of trees to capture CO2 omissions;
the loss of cultural knowledge and value; the inability for ejidal landowners to
control the development of their land; and short-term construction jobs associated
with the project leading to problems associated with temporary migration,
employment instability, and poverty).
239. See id.
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indigenous communities (once conditions of the global Covid-19
pandemic subside and these consultations can be safely carried out),
and the establishing of regular follow-up procedures for the Mexican
government to report to the Commission and/or the Court regarding
its progress in protecting indigenous rights.240
As an aside, this case also presents the opportunity for the
Commission and the Court to clarify certain areas of indigenous law
that remain ambiguous, should this case be presented before one or
both organs. Because the Convention and the Declaration only set a
general guideline of human rights obligations, it is important for the
supervisory organs to settle areas of ambiguity through the
adjudication of cases, like the one at hand, in accordance with their
mandates.241

V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is imperative that the Mexican government cease
all new construction on the Mayan Train project immediately in order
to prevent further abuses of indigenous rights. The Mexican State has
already failed to adequately consult with the indigenous communities
of the Yucatán Peninsula, and it must undergo a new consultation
process focused on achieving the free, prior, and informed consent of
the indigenous community with regard to the Mayan Train project. If
Mexico fails to do so, it will be in breach of various legal obligations
under the Convention, including the right to property, the right to equal
240. Cf. Matter of Members Choréachi Indigenous Community regarding
Mexico, Provisional Measures, Order of the Court, “Resuelve:” ¶¶ 1–9, Inter-Am.
Ct.
H.R.,
June
10,
2020,
[available
at:
https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/choreachi_se_02.pdf]
(ordering
the
Mexican State, inter alia, to adopt measures to protect the right to life of the
Choréachi community, requiring the State to collaborate with the indigenous
community on various matters, and requiring the State to update the Court of its
status in complying with the provisional measures).
241. See Organization of American States, Charter of the Organization of
American States, art. 106, Apr. 30, 1948, O.A.S.T.S. Nos. 1-C & 61, 1609 U.N.T.S.
119 (stating the principal function of the Commission as “the observance and
protection of human rights. . . .”); Organization of American States, Statute of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 1, Resolution No. 448 (Oct. 1979),
[available at: https://www.corteidh.or.cr/estatuto.cfm?lang=en] (stating that the
purpose of the Court is “the application and interpretation of the American
Convention on Human Rights.”).
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protection and judicial protection, and the obligation to protect and
ensure rights, as interpreted by the Inter-American human rights
system.

